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International law has played a role in the long history of efforts by states
to cooperate on the control of the spread of infectious diseases.' Numerous
multilateral treaties and the subsequent adoption of the International Health
Regulations ("IHR")2 by the member states of the World Health Organiza-
tion ("WHO") indicate international cognizance of the cooperation critical to
the control of infectious diseases. The international legal regime on infec-
tious diseases has, however, been characterized by routine non-compliance. 3
The failure of the IHR has become more alarming in light of the dramatic
emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases in the last thirty years.4
The return of infectious diseases to the forefront of the international public
health agenda stimulated a proposed revision of the IHR. The international
legal regime must adapt to new global circumstances.5 EIDs present, how-
ever, IHR reform advocates with an impossible mission. In this article, I out-
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I would
like to thank my research assistant, Dan DiPaola, for his help on this article.
1. For a history of international cooperation on infectious disease, see N. Howard-Jones,
Origins of International Health Work, 1 BRrr. MED. J. 1032 (May 6, 1950).
2. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS].
3. Allyn L. Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Framework for
Universal Access to Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 343 (1992) (noting that two
senior WHO health legislation officials consider IHR a failure); Katarina Tomasevski, Health, in
2 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 859, 866-68 (Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. Joyner,
eds., 1995) (analyzing the failure of IHR).
4. David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 77, 79-80 (1996) [hereinafter Fidler, Emerging Infectious Dis-
eases]. U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ADDRESSING EMERGING IN-
FECIOUS DISEASE THREATS: A PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994)
[hereinafter U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION]; WORLD HEALTH OR-
GANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1996: FIGHTING DISEASE, FOSTERING DEVELOPMENT 15
(1996) [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH REPORT] (national and international public health authori-
ties define emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases ("EIDs") as "diseases of infectious ori-
gin whose incidence in humans has increased within the past two decades or threatens to
increase in the near future").
5. World Health Assembly, Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations,
WHO Doc. WHA 48.7 (May 12, 1995).
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line the reasons why the future for the international legal regime on
infectious disease control is no more promising than its unfortunate past.
II. THE GLOBAL PROBLEM OF EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
Many readers have heard, seen, or read something about EIDs, since
this phenomenon has been described, sensationalized, and fictionalized by
the popular press and media. Reading a Time cover story,6 watching the
movie Outbreak,7 or digesting The Hot Zone8 gives a person only a small
glimpse of the overwhelming problem that EIDs pose for the world. Many,
including leaders at the highest levels of the U.S. government, believe that
EIDs represent one of the most serious threats to human well-being in con-
temporary international relations.9 Several entities during the past 27 years
documented this phenomenon. A U.S. interagency task force identified the
emergence of twenty-nine new infectious diseases and the re-emergence of
twenty old infectious diseases since 1973.10 In 1969, the United States Sur-
geon General announced that the public health, medical, and scientific com-
munities had conquered infectious diseases.1 ' In 1996, WHO reports that a
"world crisis" in infectious diseases is underway.12
The explanation for the resurgence of infectious diseases between 1969
and 1996 requires an analysis of the causes underlying the resurgence. The
list of causes is sobering both in its length and in what it contains. Literature
on the subject usually identifies the following as major causes behind EIDs:
(1) nature's power to circumvent antimicrobial pharmaceuticals and develop
drug resistance; (2) public health, medical, scientific, and political compla-
cency; (3) global travel; (4) international trade; (5) civil war and refugee
movements; (6) environmental degradation; (7) changes in human behavior
(primarily sexual behavior); (8) urbanization; (9) poverty; and (10) deterio-
6. Michael D. Lemonick, The Killers All Around: New Viruses and Drug-Resistant Bacteria
are Reversing Human Victories Over Infectious Diseases, TIME, Sept. 12, 1994, at 62 (chronicling
several recent outbreaks of infectious diseases).
7. OUTBREAK (Warner Brothers 1995) (depicting fictional outbreak of Ebola-like disease in
a small California community).
8. RICHARD PRESTON, THE HOT ZONE (1994) (describing outbreak of Ebola virus in a pri-
mate research center in Reston, Virginia).
9. See, e.g., U.S. Vice President Al Gore, Address Before the National Counsel for Interna-
tional Health (June 12, 1996) ("There is no more menacing threat to our global health today than
emerging infectious diseases."); Dennis Pirages, Microsecurity: Disease Organisms and Human
Well-Being, 18 WASH. Q. 5, 11 (Autumn 1995) ("Infectious diseases are potentially the largest
threat to human security lurking in the post-cold war world.").
10. NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL COMMITrEE ON INTERNATIONAL SCI-
ENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY, WORKING GROUP ON EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING
INFECTIoUs DISEASES - INFECTIOUS DISEASES - A GLOBAL HEALTH THREAT 14-15 (1995) [here-
inafter CISET REPORT].
11. Emerging Infections: A Significant Threat to the Nation's Health: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995) (statement of
Senator Nancy Kassebaum).
12. WORLD HEALTH REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
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rating public health infrastructures. 13 This formidable combination of phe-
nomena driving EIDs suggests that the world has increasingly developed
conditions that allow pathogenic microbes to flourish. The would-be con-
querors of infectious diseases are now suffering a global counterattack from
the microbial world on a scale of frightening proportions.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME ON INFECTIOUs DISEASES
Currently the IHR constitute the most important set of international
legal rules on infectious disease control.14 WHO adopted the IHR in 1951 to
succeed the patchwork of sanitary treaties and codes developed between
1851 and 1945.15 The international legal regime found in the IHR imposes
two fundamental duties on member states of WHO: (1) states are to notify
WHO of cholera, plague, and yellow fever outbreaks; 16 and (2) states are to
react to disease outbreaks in other states only as prescribed in the IHR. 17
These duties are indicative of the IHR's purpose of providing maximum se-
curity against the international spread of infectious diseases with minimum
interference with world traffic.18
Most experts agree, however, that the IHR have failed badly because
states routinely ignore the duties of notification and of limited response to
disease outbreaks in other states.19 The failure means that the IHR achieves
13. For a detailed examination of each of these causes see David P. Fidler, Return of the
Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman].
14. World Health Organization, Division of Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases
Surveillance and Control, Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases Strategic Plan Outline
1996-2000, at 10, WHO Doc. EMC 96.1 (1996) [hereinafter EMC Strategic Plan] (stating that the
IHR are "the only international health agreement on communicable diseases that is binding on
Member States" of WHO).
15. INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, supra note 2, art. 86(a), at 38-39 (listing trea-
ties the IHR replaced).
16. Id. art. 3, at 10 ("Each health administration shall notify the Organization ... of its
being informed that the first case of a disease subject to the Regulations ... has occurred in its
territory."). Article 1 defines "diseases subject to the Regulations" as cholera, plague, and yel-
low fever. Id. art. 1, at 8.
17. Id. art. 23, at 18 ("[H]ealth measures permitted by these Regulations are the maximum
measures applicable to international traffic, which a State may require for the protection of its
territory against the diseases subject to the Regulations.").
18. Id. at 5.
19. See, e.g., P. Dorolle, Old Plagues in the Jet Age International Aspects of Present and
Future Control of Communicable Diseases, 23 WHO CHRON. 103, 104-05 (1969) (noting break-
down in systems of notification and failure of provisions prohibiting excessive and unnecessary
measures); E. Roelsgaard, Health Regulations and International Travel, 28 WHO CHRON. 265,
266-67 (1974) (noting failure of objective of minimum interference with world traffic); P.J.
DELON, THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 24 (1975) (noting
unsatisfactory functioning of notification system and numerous instances of the application of
excessive and useless measures); CIsET REPORT, supra note 10, at 4 (noting reluctance of states
to share surveillance information); Laurie Garrett, The Return ofInfectious Disease, 75 FOREIGN
AFF. 66, 74 (Sept./Oct. 1996) (reporting reluctance of many nations to report infectious dis-
eases); David L. Heymann, The International Health Regulations: Ensuring Maximum Protec-
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neither maximum security from infectious disease spread nor minimum inter-
ference with world traffic. Further, experts noted the failure of the IHR well
before the EID crisis developed. 20 EIDs have made the IHR even more ir-
relevant to member states of WHO because the Regulations have not been
amended to keep pace with the EIDs.21
WHO has recognized the need for reform of the IHR and has already
formulated basic principles on which to base reform.22 This IHR reform ef-
fort raises the questions whether international legal reform in this area is
feasible and, if so, what form the reforms should take.
IV. CONSTRUcTING A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
The national and international public health officials analyzing the EID
crisis believe that it poses a global threat that requires global action.23 The
nature of the threat posed by pathogenic microbes, and the ease with which
they cross borders,24 makes international cooperation on infectious disease
control an essential public health objective. Put another way, the traditional
distinction between national and international public health has vanished be-
cause a state can no longer provide for its public's health without global co-
operation.25 The global nature of the infectious diseases threat, the need for
international cooperation, and the role for international law in fostering such
cooperation are not, however, new concepts. Each of these ideas has been
present in international relations since the mid-19th century when interna-
tional efforts on infectious disease control first began. 26 As the EID crisis
indicates, the global threat from pathogenic microbes has intensified; but in-
tion with Minimum Restriction, Address Before ABA Panel on Law and Emerging and Re-
Emerging Infectious Diseases (Aug. 5, 1996), in PROGRAM MATERIALS FOR LAW AND EMERG-
ING AND RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Aug. 1996, at 12-13 (noting failure of notification
duties and recent episodes of excessive measures interfering with world traffic).
20. See Dorolle, supra note 19, at 109 (finding IHR inadequate in 1969); Roelsgaard, supra
note 19, at 266-67 (discussing failure of IHR in 1974); DELON, supra note 19, at 24 (analyzing
problems with IHR in 1975); DAVID LEIVE, I INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 89-99
(1976) (analyzing weaknesses of IHR during cholera epidemic of the 1960s).
21. Heymann, supra note 19, at 12 (observing that IHR do not cover many EIDs).
22. The principles guiding reform of the IHR are found in World Health Organization,
Division of Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control, The Interna-
tional Response to Epidemics and Application of the International Health Regulations: Report of
a WHO Informal Consultation, WHO Doc. EMC/IHR/96.1 (Dec. 11-14, 1995) [hereinafter Re-
port of WHO Informal Consultation].
23. See, e.g., World Health Organization, Communicable Disease Prevention and Control:
New, Emerging, and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases - Report by the Director-General, WHO
Doc. A48/15 (Feb. 22, 1995) at 2 (stating that EIDs "represent a global threat that will require a
coordinated, global response").
24. See Mary E. Wilson, Travel and the Emergence of Infectious Diseases, 1 EMERGING IN-
FECTaoUs DISEASES 39, 39 (1995) (arguing that "[t]ravel is a potent force in the emergence of
disease").
25. U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra 4, at 12.
26. See generally, Howard-Jones, supra note 1, at 1032 (explaining the history of interna-
tional cooperation on infectious diseases).
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ternational cooperation on infectious disease control through the IHR is su-
perficial. Despite the compelling logic that international cooperation
through international law is essential to control the spread of infectious dis-
eases, states routinely undermine international cooperation through non-
compliance with the IHR.
International relations scholarship in the form of "regime theory" can
help explain why states deliberately undermine international cooperation
and international law on infectious disease control. Regime theorists ex-
amine why states develop rules and norms to regulate behavior, and they
posit that non-cooperative behavior results from rational calculations driven
by the uncertainty created by the anarchical international system.27 In such
a system, cooperation is difficult to achieve and maintain. When states
strongly desire the benefits of mutual cooperation, they often develop rules,
procedures, and institutions to facilitate cooperation and discourage non-
cooperation. 28
Regime theorists often use game theory to illustrate the rationality of
non-cooperation. 29 In our "game," two states, A and B, face the decision
whether to cooperate on infectious disease control. An infectious disease
breaks out in B, and B must decide whether to notify A of this outbreak. A
has to decide whether it will cooperate with B by limiting its reaction to the
disease outbreak and thus not cause B economic or other harm. Figure 1







Under these conditions, A and B share a dominant strategy-non-
cooperation. The dominant strategy of non-cooperation is explained because
A and B each has an "offensive" and "defensive" incentive not to comply.
The "offensive" incentive arises because the highest possible payoff comes
27. Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for Interna-
tional Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INr'L L. 335, 346-51 (1989) (discussing model of modem international
relations theory that stresses anarchical nature of the system and the rationality of state
behavior).
28. Id. at 354 (stating that the "creation of rules, regimes, and institutions is seen as a pur-
poseful activity designed to improve unsatisfactory situations").
29. Id. at 355 (noting that game theory has "become a valuable tool for modern
I[nternational] R[elations] scholars").
3,3 1,4
(Box 1) (Box 2)
4,1 2,2
(Box 3) (Box 4)
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through non-compliance when the other state complies (Boxes 2 and 3). The
"defensive" incentive also arises because non-compliance (Box 4) has a
higher payoff than unilateral compliance. Maximizing the payoff from a
decision encourages A and B not to cooperate. 30
Although game theory is a crude analytical device, the results of our
"game" accord with the history of non-cooperation between states under the
IHR. The game suggests that mutual cooperation yields the highest
aggregate payoff. This result matches our expectations created by the need
for international cooperation on infectious disease control. Non-cooperation
results, however, because neither state completely trusts that the other will
cooperate; and such uncertainty produces the rational decision to maximize
the payoff by not cooperating. States often fail to report infectious disease
outbreaks out of a well-founded fear that other states will react in a way that
causes economic harm to the states suffering the outbreak. 31 Once non-
cooperation occurs at the disease outbreak notification stage, non-
cooperation is likely to be the policy adopted by other states. Game theory,
thus, provides a plausible framework for explaining non-cooperation among
states under the IHR.
Two recent episodes involving non-compliance with the IHR illustrate
more concretely the general insights of game theory outlined above. In 1991,
Peru notified WHO of cholera outbreaks in its territory pursuant to the IHR.
As a result of measures not in compliance with the IHR taken by other states
after the notification, Peru suffered economic losses estimated at $700
million. 32 Peru experienced what game theorists call the "sucker's payoff'
for unilateral cooperation. 33 Other states facing the decision whether to
comply with the IHR undoubtedly take note of the lack of cooperation
Peru's unilateral compliance achieved. In 1994, outbreaks of plague occurred
in India. 34 India did not notify WHO of the outbreaks until well after they
had become widely known through the international media.35 India's non-
compliance was matched by other states, which took actions contrary to the
IHR that caused losses in Indian trade and travel of approximately $1.7
billion. 36 The conclusions that can be drawn from these two specific episodes
are the lessons of game theory: state behavior tends towards mutual non-
cooperation where the incentives to cooperate are weak and the costs of non-
cooperation are non-existent.
Regime theorists posit that states can reduce the incentives for non-
cooperation by designing rules or norms that allow for better dissemination
of information, clarify standards behavior, provide monitoring for behavior,
30. Id. at 358-60 (explaining dynamics of the prisoners' dilemma game).
31. Dorolle, supra note 19, at 104-05; DELON, supra note 19, at 24; CISET REPORT, supra
note 10, at 4; Heymann, supra note 19, at 12.
32. Heymann, supra note 19, at 12.
33. Abbott, supra note 27, at 359.





and/or create sanctions for non-compliance. 37 The IHR represent just such
an attempt to encourage cooperation because the Regulations lay down rules
for the dissemination of information (i.e., the notification duties) and set
standards for behavior (i.e., notification duties and duties to react in a
prescribed way to notified outbreaks). The IHR do not, however, contain
any provisions for monitoring compliance or imposing sanctions for
violations. As the failure of the IHR demonstrates, the IHR do not
overcome the incentives for non-cooperation. Put another way, the IHR do
not provide sufficient incentives for cooperation or impose sufficient costs for
non-cooperation. 38 Regime theory points towards radically revising the IHR
to provide appropriate incentives for cooperation and costs for non-
cooperation.
V. MISSION IMPOSSIBLE
The objective of radical revision of the IHR generated by utilizing re-
gime theory is, however, not feasible for three major reasons. First, the prin-
ciples shaping WHO's revision of the IHR do little more than expand the
IHR's coverage while seeking to clarify the existing set of rules. 39 An under-
lying theme of the proposed revisions is that states just need to understand
the IHR better and things will improve.4 0 This attitude suggests that after
flouting the IHR for decades states just need some education "to see the
light" and participate properly in the international legal regime. In critiques
of WHO's proposals for revision of the IHR, international legal scholars ar-
gue that the WHO proposals for IHR reform are inadequate and advocate
establishing monitoring and/or enforcement mechanisms in the revised
IHR.41 These proposals echo the advice of regime theory which is to change
substantially the incentives and costs for compliance and non-compliance
with the IHR. The approach taken by WHO does not, however, reflect na-
ivete by WHO personnel. Rather it reflects WHO's sense that its member
37. Abbott, supra note 27, at 367-68.
38. As one scholar argues:
it is questionable whether nations perceive the benefits of their individual compliance
with the Regulations as outweighing the national benefits of noncompliance ...
Nations may also tend to violate the International Health Regulations because the
advantages of noncompliance . . . are viewed as outweighing the costs. Indeed, the
specific, immediate costs of violating the International Health Regulations appear to be
particularly low.
Allyn L. Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of Infectious Diseases: Toward a Reinforced Role
for the International Health Regulations, 32 HOUSTON L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
39. Heymann, supra note 19, at 15 (listing four principles that are to guide revision of IHR:
(1) expand IHR coverage from three diseases to disease syndromes of international importance;
(2) develop a practical handbook to facilitate use of revised IHR; (3) integrate revised IHR into
all epidemiological activities; and (4) expand IHR to include descriptions of inappropriate reac-
tions to disease outbreaks in other states).
40. Report of WHO Informal Consultation, supra note 22, at 14 (recommending guidelines
and a practical handbook to help states understand the IHR).
41. See Taylor, supra note 38 (advocating monitoring mechanisms); Fidler, Return of the
Fourth Horseman, supra note 13 (advocating monitoring and enforcement mechanisms).
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states will only agree to IHR revisions that are not radical or that do not
depart significantly from the status quo. WHO seems to have concluded that
radical changes in the IHR are unrealistic. This resignation implicitly ac-
knowledges that creating an effective international legal regime on infectious
disease control along the lines suggested by regime theory is not feasible.
Second, the lack of optimism on the part of WHO suggests that not all
states equally consider international infectious disease control to be in their
self-interests. Regime theory assumes that states share a strong desire for
cooperation that appropriate rules and norms creating the right balance of
costs and benefits can buttress. The history of the IHR indicates that the
desire for international cooperation on infectious disease control has been
less than enthusiastic. In the EID crisis, history is merely repeating itself.
Initial efforts in the mid-19th century to develop international cooperation
arose because Europeans feared the spread of disease to Europe from non-
European nations. 42 Today, the attention being generated on EIDs comes
mainly from the developed world, which fears the spread of infectious dis-
eases from the developing world. In many developing states, infectious dis-
eases are endemic and not "re-emerging." Developing states need massive
financial and technical assistance to deal with endemic diseases more than
rules to prevent their diseases from traveling to the developed world. While
infectious disease spread affects developing states adversely, the primary in-
terest developing states have is getting control of the situation at home.43
International infectious disease control constitutes what international re-
lations theorists call a "public or collective good" because provision of con-
trol requires collective action among states and because no state can really be
excluded from the benefits of such control.44 Providing a collective good
faces two problems: (1) it will be provided only if the beneficiaries bear the
costs and (2) non-excludability gives each potential beneficiary an incentive
not to contribute to the costs of producing the collective good (i.e., the free-
rider problem). 45 These problems mean that the collective good will be pro-
vided for only if either (1) a hegemonic state agrees to bear the costs and
subsidize the free riders, or (2) states cooperate to produce the collective
good in the absence of hegemonic power.46 Non-hegemonic cooperation in
producing collective goods often relies on trying to exclude free riders, even
42. Howard-Jones, supra note 1, at 1035 (arguing that international health activities in the
19th century were motivated by European fears of contamination by non-European nations);
The Future of International Health Law: A Roundtable, 40 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 1, 5 (1989)
(statement of Michel B1anger that international health law in the 19th century corresponded
"primarily with the requirements of European countries").
43. The AIDS crisis demonstrates that developing countries are vulnerable to the interna-
tional spread of infectious diseases, suggesting that developing states have interests in an effec-
tive international legal regime. The question is one of priority, and developing states face crises
at home that dwarf the fears of developed states about international infectious disease spread.
44. Abbott, supra note 27, at 377 (defining public or collective goods).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 383-88 (discussing theories of hegemonic and non-hegemonic cooperation).
[Vol. 10
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if exclusion cannot be complete.4 7 In the collective good of international in-
fectious disease control, the U.S. is the only likely hegemonic power, but it
seems unwilling to underwrite the costs of an effective international regime. 48
Further, excluding free riders (which would be predominantly developing
states) from an international legal regime on infectious disease control would
be counterproductive from a public health perspective. The collective good
of international infectious disease control will only be produced if developed
states bear the greatest portion of the costs. 4 9 Developing states will use
their weakness and the threat they pose to developed states to bargain for
transfers of financial and technological resources. 50 Whether developed
states value effective international infectious disease control enough to fund
public health improvements in, and to subsidize cooperation by, developing
countries and endure free riding in the current climate of budgetary concern
in developed states is a dubious proposition.
Third, even assuming that all states demand effective international infec-
tious disease control and that WHO was willing to create and maintain a
radically different set of IHR, the international legal regime would be under
constant strain because even radical IHR reforms would not address the un-
derlying causes of EIDs. For example, urbanization in the context of deep
poverty in developing countries will continue to provide pathogenic microbes
fertile conditions. Global trade and travel will continue to provide opportu-
nities for such microbes to spread around the world. The continuation of the
underlying causes will force the costs of international cooperation to increase
as infectious diseases continue to emerge and re-emerge. Such constantly
escalating costs would erode any carefully calibrated incentives and disincen-
tives built into radically-revamped IHR. This strain would encourage states
to fall back into the dynamics of suspicious rationality, with the results pre-
dicted by game theory and unfortunately recorded in the previous history of
the IHR. The idea that states will pursue international legal regimes to deal
with the underlying causes of EIDs in order to support international infec-
tious disease control is far-fetched at best.
WHO officials and others see in the technology of the telecommunica-
tions revolution a bright spot in the otherwise dark picture.51 The power of
global telecommunications offers a way for technology to alter the traditional
47. Id. at 386 (noting that a developing aspect of non-hegemonic cooperation theory is the
possibility of excluding non-contributing states).
48. CISET REPORT, supra note 10, at 43 (stating that major U.S. contributions to global
infectious disease control efforts "is not a likely prospect during this period of deficit reduction
and downsizing").
49. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman, supra note 13.
50. Fidler, Emerging Infectious Diseases, supra note 4, at 81.
51. U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 21 (recom-
mending use of the Internet to facilitate a global surveillance system); CISET REPORT, supra note
10, at 5, 23 (supporting application of information technology to international control of infec-
tious diseases); Gore, supra note 9, at 7 (advocating utilization of the information superhigh-
way); EMC Strategic Plan, supra note 14, at 6 (proposing use of the World Wide Web to
disseminate information).
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dynamics of international politics on infectious disease control by allowing
information on disease outbreaks to become almost universally available.
Such global access to public health information undermines a state's ability to
conceal a disease outbreak because it fears economic losses from the over-
reactions of other states. The "offensive" incentive not to cooperate disap-
pears for a state suffering a disease outbreak. 52 Access to timely disease
outbreak information via cyberspace also would allow states to determine
more effectively and rationally how to react to disease outbreaks elsewhere.
The global telecommunications revolution might encourage states to aban-
don old mind frames about infectious diseases and be more open to effective
international cooperation and control. As a result of this potential impact by
global telecommunications technology, reforms of the IHR might not need to
be as radical as some have suggested. 53 The cautious, limited approach of
WHO towards IHR reform makes more sense when combined with the antic-
ipated impact of the global telecommunications revolution.
Whether realism dies in cyberspace remains to be seen. Global telecom-
munications technology represents a small ray of hope in an otherwise fore-
boding fog. The outbreaks of plague in India in 1994 suggest that states
receiving timely information on disease outbreaks in other countries through
international communications media do not act with more prudence and re-
straint than they have in the past. New technologies have emerged before
without changing the dynamics of international infectious disease control.
Science, after all, was once hailed as the conqueror of infectious diseases.
What should be remembered about the promise of cyberspace is that it only
spreads information about the continuing ravages of infectious diseases more
quickly. Such rapid flows of public health information may or may not facili-
tate better infectious disease surveillance and intervention, but they do not
deal with the conditions that nurture the often lethal power of pathogenic
microbes. Where we once looked to science and technology to eradicate dis-
ease, now we merely anticipate that they will tell us faster how badly the
human species is faring against the microbial world. This anticipation pro-
vides little comfort to those concerned with the prospects for international
law on infectious disease control or the prospects for the human condition.
52. As WHO experts put it, "in this age of wide media coverage, nothing can be hidden."
Report of WHO Informal Consultation, supra note 22, at 10.
53. Under regime theory, eliminating the "offensive" incentive not to cooperate changes
the prisoners' dilemma game into a stag hunt game, where there remains only "defensive" incen-
tives not to cooperate. Abbott, supra note 27, at 368. Regime theorists posit that rules to cor-
rect the stag hunt situation need not be as stringent and institutionalized as rules needed to deal
with the prisoners' dilemma scenario. Id. at 371.
[Vol. 10
